

One method, from regulation to proof.
The DICB Cyber Compliance Model™ takes any cyber regulation from open-textured legal text to obligations an organisation can run, evidence it can defend, and a record that outlives the people who built it.
Governance
Who owns the decision, under what authority, and what the record shows.
Regulation
What the law requires today, what is draft, what is proposed, and the difference.
Evidence
What an organisation can actually demonstrate, to a board, an auditor or a regulator.
Three problems. Most organisations have all of them.
Regulated organisations have frameworks, tooling and growing supervisory pressure, and still cannot answer simple questions about their own estate. DICB’s founding paper argues that three structural deficits explain a significant part of that gap, and that they are routinely assumed to be solved when they are not.
Translation
Which systems does this obligation actually reach, and who decided that?
There is no widely adopted method for taking open-textured regulatory language to a decision at system level. Interpretation happens, but the reasons are rarely kept. The quality of the translation depends on whoever did it.
Institutional continuity
Who knows the answer, and what happens when they leave?
The compliance state lives in experienced people and scattered records, not in a form the institution owns and can query. Audit readiness changes when a person resigns, although no control, system or law has changed.
Evidence quality
Is this attached, or is it proven?
Evidence is treated as present or missing rather than weighed against the claim it is meant to support. A policy proves that a policy was approved. It does not prove the control operated last week.
The three deficits compound into borrowed confidence: a reported status whose apparent precision exceeds the quality of the mappings and proof beneath it.The Three Problems of Cyber Regulatory Compliance, Section 6
Seven requirements, written so that they can be failed
The paper derives seven design requirements for an adequate discipline and states them as testable criteria, not as claims that DICB has already met them. Any method, including DICB’s own, can be judged against them.
Together they describe what a regulator, an auditor or a board is really asking for when they ask “can you prove that?”

Reproducible translation
Competent practitioners given the same obligation and context should produce substantially convergent records, with interpretations, assumptions and divergences explicit, reasoned and reviewable.
Obligation-scope granularity
State, ownership, applicability, exceptions and evidence attach to discrete obligation-scope units, not to whole standards. Unknown is a reportable state, never silently converted to compliant.
Institutional residence
The complete demonstrable compliance state is held in an institution-owned, current and queryable form that survives staff transitions and answers supervisory questions directly.
Claim-relative fitness
Evidence is assessed against the proposition it is meant to support or refute: relevance, directness, scope, sufficiency, independence or corroboration, and consistency.
Provenance and integrity
Artefacts meet defined tests for traceability, reviewability, attribution, contemporaneity and enduring integrity before they are admitted to support a conclusion.
Temporal honesty
Reported posture reflects time-based decline, event-triggered invalidation and coverage erosion. Stale, superseded or scope-incomplete evidence cannot keep full credit invisibly.
Examinable and interoperable practice
The method is teachable and practitioners are examinable against it. Records can be kept by hand and represented in machine-readable formats compatible with established standards, including the Open Security Controls Assessment Language (OSCAL).
One model, four layers
DICB’s answer to the three problems is a codification: standards for translation and evidence, a platform for continuity, a method that binds them into daily practice, and a credential that examines people against it. Each layer rests on the one beneath it.
The Three Problems of Cyber Regulatory Compliance
Translation, Institutional Continuity, and Evidence Quality: a position paper towards an evidence-led discipline. Dr Joseph Ikhalia, SSRN, July 2026. It defines the deficits, examines prior art and two public supervisory cases, derives the seven requirements, and names the research that could prove it wrong.
Translation, continuity and evidence, specified
DICB Cyber Regulatory Translation Standard™
The same questions, the same order of reasoning and the same record structure for every obligation. Its output is the Canonical Obligation Record.
DICB Canonical Obligation Record
One interpreted obligation joined to its source, reasoning, scope, controls, owner, state, exceptions, dependencies and evidence. The atom everything else is built from.
DICB TRACE Evidence Standard™
Three linked instruments: the TRACE Evidence Quality Test as the admissibility gate, the Evidence Matrix for claim-relative judgement, and the Evidence Decay Model for temporal honesty.
DICB Evidence Matrix
Evidence judged against four kinds of claim: control design, implementation, operating effectiveness, and governance and decision. No artefact is strong for every claim.
DICB Evidence Decay Model
Three ways evidence loses current value: time-based decline, event-triggered invalidation and coverage erosion. No universal half-life.
DICB Obligarium™
The Cyber Compliance Digital Twin: a continuously current model of obligations, systems, controls, owners, dependencies, exceptions, decisions and evidence, built to answer a regulator’s question directly.
DICB Compliance Benchmark™
Governed, anonymised assessment results accumulated for comparative measurement and future calibration. No benchmark claim is made before sample size and limitations are defined.
DICB Cyber Compliance Method™
One working sequence that brings the Translation Standard, the TRACE Evidence Standard and institutional continuity into practice: five steps carried from obligation to decision. It is what the DICB Certified Cyber Regulatory Practitioner course teaches and what the examination tests.
DICB Certified Cyber Regulatory Practitioner (DICB-CCRP)
Complete the course, pass the examination, become certified. Launching December 2026.
The same questions, in the same order, every time
The Translation Standard does not pretend that legal or engineering judgement is unnecessary. Regulatory language is open-textured by design, and interpretation cannot be removed from the process. What the Standard removes is avoidable inconsistency: it requires the same questions, the same order of reasoning and the same record structure for every obligation, and it keeps the reasons.
The output is the Canonical Obligation Record. One duty per record. Applicability and scope decided with a rationale. An accountable owner by role and by name. A state that is declared only once the evidence position is known, with unknown reportable rather than quietly rounded up to compliant. An exception that explains non-compliance and never converts it.
Records are as coarse as the truth allows and generated rather than rewritten, so an estate of five thousand systems does not need five thousand rules.
- 01Authoritative source
- 02Requirement
- 03Reasoned interpretation
- 04Assumptions and uncertainty
- 05Applicability logic
- 06Affected scope
- 07Control mapping
- 08Accountable owner
- 09Current state
- 10Exceptions
- 11Dependencies
- 12Evidence claims
- 13Evidence references
- 14Review history
Before evidence counts, it has to be admitted
The TRACE Evidence Quality Test is the gate. An artefact enters the evidential record only if it is all five of these.
Traceable
The origin, collection path, transformations and relationship to the claim can be followed.
Reviewable
A competent reviewer can access, understand and challenge the artefact and the method that produced it.
Attributable
Linked to an identifiable, authoritative person, system, process or source.
Contemporaneous
Created or captured close enough to the period, event or state it claims to evidence.
Enduring
Preserved with integrity, retrievable, and retained for as long as later review requires.
Passing the gate shows that an artefact is well preserved. It does not show that the artefact proves anything. That is a separate test, and keeping the two apart is the point.
Judged against the claim, not counted as attachments
The DICB Evidence Matrix asks what the evidence is for. A policy is weak evidence that a control operated yesterday, but direct evidence that a policy was approved. Telemetry may prove technical activity and still be incapable of proving that a risk was knowingly accepted by the person with authority to accept it. Four kinds of claim, four different answers to what counts as strong.
Control design
Was the control appropriately designed for the interpreted obligation and the risk?
An approved control specification, reviewed architecture, risk analysis, a design decision record.
Policy text with no control design. An unsupported management assertion.
Implementation
Was the designed control deployed across the required scope?
Direct configuration or inventory data, deployment records, validated system mappings, inspection.
Generic screenshots. A project plan. A statement that deployment occurred.
Operating effectiveness
Did the control operate consistently during the relevant period?
Continuous or repeated telemetry, sufficiently scoped testing, independent test results, exception data.
A single point-in-time artefact for a period claim. A policy. An uncorroborated attestation.
Governance and decision
Was ownership, approval, risk acceptance or escalation validly exercised?
An authorised workflow record, a signed decision, contemporaneous minutes, a responsibility map, a reasoned exception record.
Technical telemetry. An informal email. An undocumented verbal approval.

Three ways evidence goes stale
The DICB Evidence Decay Model refuses a single universal half-life. How long evidence stays good depends on the claim, the artefact, how fast the estate changes and what has happened since it was captured.
Time-based decline
Credit falls progressively unless renewed or corroborated. A penetration test becomes less representative as releases and threat conditions accumulate.
Event-triggered invalidation
A material release, a control redesign, a certificate expiry or a supplier change breaks the link between the artefact and the live state. The artefact stays historically authentic. It stops proving the present.
Coverage erosion
Fresh telemetry covers one region, platform or supplier while the claim covers all of them. Coverage credit falls, and the uncovered population becomes explicit instead of invisible.
Five steps, carried from obligation to decision
The DICB Cyber Compliance Method brings the standards into one working sequence. The compliance state is declared at the end, after the evidence, and not before.
Assess the obligation
Isolate the source, extract one duty per record, interpret it with reasons, and decide applicability and scope.
Link it to cyber risk
Connect the obligation to the risks it exists to reduce and the systems that carry them, and set priority.
Implement controls
Map controls, assign an accountable owner by role and by name, and govern exceptions explicitly.
Gather evidence
Admit artefacts through TRACE, judge them against the claim, and record what is missing as missing.
Navigate governance
Declare the state, report it without changing its colour, and secure a sign-off that can be defended later.

Nairobi, 31 October 2026
Thirty professionals from banking, law, technology, insurance and government carried one use case through the sequence in a morning: assessed the risk, built a register entry, screened it against Kenyan law and wrote a one-page briefing their leadership could act on. Four working papers each, and a method to take home.
What the method does not yet claim
A discipline that asks organisations to be honest about their evidence has to be honest about itself. The founding paper states its limits in its own text. The components have substantial prior art in financial audit, records management, digital forensics, organisational memory and continuous auditing; the claimed contribution is their unification at obligation level into one teachable discipline, not the invention of each part.
The empirical base is limited, and the continuity proposition in particular needs direct testing. The Evidence Matrix and the Decay Model are architectural, not calibrated, and fixed scores will not be published merely because software can calculate them.
The author holds a commercial interest in the codification, which is why the problem analysis is published separately from the answer and the discipline remains open to alternative codifications that meet the same requirements.
Seven research streams are specified to disprove, refine or constrain the central claims, with both positive and negative results to be published. The decisive test is not the elegance of the vocabulary. It is whether different practitioners translate obligations more consistently, and whether organisations can answer a regulator in minutes without heroics.
A control is not what the policy says should happen. It is what you can prove happened.Dr Joseph Ikhalia
Learn it, or bring it into your organisation
DICB Certified Cyber Regulatory Practitioner
A self-paced course of about five hours, with a workbook, built on a real regulation of your choice. Complete the course, pass the examination, become certified. Launching December 2026.
Compliance services built on the method
Cyber regulatory compliance services, artificial intelligence use case assessments, executive briefings and private cohorts, all run on the same standards described on this page. Independence is part of the method: DICB does not certify governance it built.